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Tackling the illegitimate under-reporting of salaries 
in Southeast Europe: some lessons from a 2015 
survey in Bulgaria, Croatia and FYR Macedonia 
 
Colin C. WILLIAMS*, Josip FRANIC** 
 
 
Abstract 
 
To tackle the illegitimate employer practice of under-reporting salaries, the 
conventional deterrence policy approach seeks to increase the penalties and risk 
of detection. Recently, however, calls have been made for a new more indirect 
approach that enhances tax morale so as to nurture a culture of self-regulation. 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate these two policy approaches. Reporting 
evidence from 6,019 face-to-face interviews conducted in Bulgaria, Croatia and 
FYR Macedonia in 2015, logit regression analysis reveals no association between 
salary under-reporting and the perceived level of penalties and risk of detection, 
but a strong association between salary under-reporting and the level of tax 
morale. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of the findings for 
theory and policy.   
 
Keywords: envelope wages, tax morale, informal economy, Southeast Europe 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is now widely recognised that some employers use illegal labour practices 
to reduce their labour costs. These illegal practices include employing wholly 
undeclared labour, outsourcing or sub-FRQWUDFWLQJ ZRUN WR WKH µERJXV VHOI-
HPSOR\HG¶DQGGHFODULQJRQO\DSRUWLRQRIWKHVDODU\RIDIRUPDOHPSOR\HHDQG
paying the remainder as an undeFODUHGµHQYHORSH¶ZDJH$OL\HY%RHOV
2014; Horodnic, 2016; Karpuskiene, 2007; Meriküll and Staehr, 2010; Neef, 
2002; Sedlenieks, 2003; Williams, 2007, 2008, 2009a,b; Williams, Horodnic and 
+RURGQLFäDENRDQG5DMHYVND8QOHVVVXFKLOlegal labour practices 
are addressed, the result will be a diminution of state control over the quality of 
working conditions, a weakening of collective bargaining, and unfair competition 
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for legitimate businesses (Andrews, Caldera Sanchez and Johansson, 2011; TUC 
2008). The aim of this paper is to advance knowledge on how to combat these 
illegal labour practices in southeast Europe by evaluating the specific fraudulent 
employer practice of under-UHSRUWLQJ HPSOR\HHV¶ VDODULHV WR WKH DXWKRULWLHV LQ
order to evade their full social insurance and tax liabilities (Chavdarova, 2014; 
Williams, 2009c, d; Woolfson, 2007).  
Conventionally, the dominant approach has been to deter participation in 
illegal labour practices by ensuring that the perceived likelihood and cost of being 
caught and punished outweigh the benefits (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). This is 
done by increasing the actual or perceived penalties and risks of detection. Given 
the difficulties in detecting formal employees who are paid an additional envelope 
wage by their formal employers, recent years have seen the emergence of a new 
more indirect approach that improves tax morale, namely the intrinsic motivation to 
pay taxes, in order to foster a culture of self-regulation (Alm, Cherry, Jones and 
McKee, 2010; Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, McKee and Torgler, 2009; Kirchler, 
2007; Murphy, 2008; Torgler, 2007). It therefore seeks to improve tax morale by 
aligning the informal institutions (i.e. the beliefs of employers and employees) with 
the codified laws and regulations of the formal institutions (Alm, Kirchler, 
Muelhbacher, Gangl, Hofmann, Logler and Pollai, 2012; Alm and Torgler, 2011; 
Torgler, 2012). The aim of this paper is to evaluate which of these two approaches 
is better suited to combating salary under-reporting in southeast Europe. This will 
reveal that across Bulgaria, Croatia and FYR Macedonia, the conventional 
deterrence approach is less relevant and effective than the new emergent tax morale 
approach which seeks to encourage self-regulation. 
To commence, therefore, next section reviews the literature on salary 
under-reporting followed by the literature on these two policy approaches, namely 
the deterrence and tax morale approaches, so as to formulate some hypotheses for 
evaluation with regard to southeast Europe. The following section then introduces 
the data and methodology to evaluate these hypotheses, namely a logit regression 
analysis of 6,019 face-to-face interviews conducted in 2015 in Bulgaria, Croatia 
and FYR Macedonia. The results are reported in section 3. Finding no significant 
association between salary under-reporting and the perceived level of penalties 
and risk of detection on the one hand, but a significant association with the level 
of tax morale, last section then concludes by discussing the need for greater 
emphasis on improving tax morale when tackling salary under-reporting in 
southeast Europe and beyond. 
 
1. Tackling salary under-reporting: a literature review  
 
Since the turn of the millennium, a body of scholarship has brought to the 
fore how some formal employers pursue the illegal practice of evading social 
insurance and tax payments, and consequently labour costs, by paying a formal 
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employee two salaries; a declared official salary and an additional off-the-books 
XQGHFODUHG µHQYHORSH¶ ZDJH WKDW LV hidden from the authorities. This happens 
usually when a candidate is interviewed for a job. Alongside agreeing an official 
declared wage, which is detailed in a formal written contract, the employer 
verbally states that the employee ZLOO UHFHLYH DQ DGGLWLRQDO µHQYHORSH ZDJH¶
(Chavdarova, 2014; Williams, 2009a; Woolfson, 2007). Unless the employee 
agrees, then generally they do not get the job. Until now, very little, if any, 
research has been undertaken on whether additional conditions are attached when 
this verbal contract is agreed and, if so, the type of conditions that are attached by 
employers. These conditions might include firstly, that the employee will not take 
their full annual leave entitlement, secondly, that they will work for more hours 
than is stated in their written contract (such as working over the maximum hours 
in the work hours directive and/or receiving less than the minimum hourly wage), 
and/or thirdly, that they will undertake a different job in terms of tasks and 
responsibilities to that specified in their formal contract (Williams, 2014). This 
verbal contract, therefore, replaces the formal written contract of employment. It 
LV WKH XQZULWWHQ µSV\FKRORJLFDO FRQWUDFW¶ UHJDUGLQJ WKHLU FRQGLWLRQV RI
employment (Rousseau, 1995). Verbal agreements, of course, are not by definition 
illegal. Indeed, in many countries they hold the same weight in law as written 
contracts. Nevertheless, this particular verbal contract to under-report salaries is 
by definition illegal. It is an agreement to fraudulently under-report to the state the 
salary of an employee so as to evade the full tax and social security payments 
owed by the employee and employer.  
 
1.1. Prevalence and distribution of salary under-reporting 
 
What, therefore, is known about the prevalence and distribution of salary 
under-reporting? Most of the early studies were small-scale qualitative studies of 
this practice in specific East-Central European nations, such as Bulgaria 
(Chavdarova, 2014), Estonia (Meriküll and Staehr, 2010), Latvia (Kukk and Staehr, 
2014; Meriküll and Staehr, 2010; OECD, 2003; Sedlenieks, 2003), Lithuania 
(Meriküll and Staehr, 2010; Woolfson, 2007), Romania (Neef, 2002), Russia 
(Williams and Round, 2008) and Ukraine (Round, Williams and Rodgers, 2008; 
Williams, 2007). For instance, Woolfson (2007) provides an in-depth case study of 
one person, a cause celebre, in Lithuania, whilst Sedlenieks (2003) in Latvia uses 
15 interviews with people in Riga. The Ukraine survey, meanwhile, is based on 600 
households, but in only three localities (Williams, 2007), whilst the study in Russia 
is confined to 313 households in three districts of the city of Moscow (Williams and 
Round, 2007). The result is that these nationally unrepresentative studies have been 
unable to document its prevalence and distribution. 
Nevertheless, they have provided clues to its extensiveness. In Ukraine, 30 
per cent of formal employees are found to receive an envelope wage from their 
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formal employer (Williams, 2007), whilst 65 per cent do so in Moscow (Williams 
and Round, 2007). In a survey in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1998 and 2002 
comprising 900 interviews, the finding is that 19.5 per cent, 16.3 per cent and 7.2 
per cent received envelope wages respectively in 1998 and 9.6 per cent, 22.5 per 
cent and 11.7 per cent respectively in 2002 (Meriküll and Staehr, 2010). These 
studies, however, were at the peak of the transition process in these post-socialist 
societies.  
The first extensive cross-national study of the extent of envelope wages was 
undertaken in 2007 when, as part of a Eurobarometer survey on undeclared work, 
several questions were asked on whether employees had been paid envelope 
wages. The resultant dataset, namely special Eurobarometer no. 284, involved 
11,135 interviews with formal employees across the 27 member states of the 
European Union (EU-27). This revealed not only the extent of the practice of 
salary under-reporting in European regions such as the Baltic region (Williams, 
2009d), South-Eastern Europe (Williams, 2010, 2012a; Williams et al., 2011), and 
Central and Eastern Europe (Williams, 2008a,b, 2009b,c, 2012b; Williams and 
Round, 2008) but also in the EU-27 as a whole (Williams, 2009a; Williams and 
Padmore, 2013a,b). This survey identifies that 5.5 per cent of formal employees 
had under-reported salaries in the EU-27 in 2007, and that 43 per cent of their 
gross salary was on average paid in this manner. However, variations across EU 
regions were apparent with a clear East/West and North/South divide with salary 
under-reporting much higher in the East and South than the West and North, as 
was the portion of the gross wage paid as an undeclared wage higher (e.g., 
Williams, 2009a, 2013).  
This Eurobarometer survey was repeated in 2013 in special Eurobarometer 
no. 402 involving face-to-face interviews with 11.025 dependent employees from 
28 member states (European Commission, 2014). This revealed that one in 33 
employees receives under-reported salaries and that similar variations continued to 
persist across the EU regions (Williams and Horodnic, 2016).  
How, therefore, can this illegal practice of under-reporting salaries be 
tackled? To answer this, it is important to evaluate the effectiveness of the two 
main policy approaches so far discussed. Each is here considered in turn. 
 
1.2. Deterrence approach 
 
The origins of the deterrence approach lie in the classical works of both 
Jeremy Bentham (Bentham, 1983, first published in 1788) and Cesare Beccaria 
(Beccaria, 1986, first published in 1797). In their utilitarian theory of crime, 
citizens evaluate the opportunities and risks, and break the law if the expected 
penalty and probability of being caught is smaller than the benefits to be gained 
by disobeying the law. This view was popularised by Becker (1968) in the late 
1960s. During the early 1970s, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) then applied it to 
Tackling the illegitimate under-reporting of salaries in Southeast Europe  |  9 
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tax non-compliance, arguing that the non-compliant evade tax as long as the pay-
off is greater than the expected cost of being caught and punished. The intention 
thus became one of changing the cost/benefit ratio confronting those engaged or 
thinking about participating in non-compliance. Akin to the study of crime, this 
was achieved by increasing the actual and/or perceived risks of detection and thus 
costs. This was subsequently widely adopted (e.g., Grabiner, 2000; Hasseldine 
and Li, 1999; Job, Stout and Smith, 2007; Richardson and Sawyer, 2001).  
Despite its wide acceptance and common usage by most governments in 
southeast Europe and beyond, the evidence that increasing the risks of detection 
elicits compliance is less than conclusive (Alm, McClelland and Schulze, 1992; 
Alm, Sanchez and De Juan, 1995; Slemrod, Blumenthal and Christian, 2001; 
Varma and Doob, 1998). Not only are studies inconclusive that increasing the 
perceived or actual penalties, and increasing the risks of detection, reduces non-
compliance, but the particular problem confronted with salary under-reporting is 
that this is difficult for tax and labour inspectorates to detect. These, after all, are 
formal employees with a formal written contract of employment working for a 
formal employer and the additional contract is verbal. As such, this additional 
unwritten agreement is not only difficult to detect but also to prove. Despite this, 
such an approach remains dominant. To evaluate the validity of this deterrence 
approach in relation to salary under-reporting, therefore, the following hypothesis 
can be tested: 
   
Deterrence hypothesis (H1): the greater the perceived penalties and risk of 
detection, the lower is the likelihood of salary under-reporting, ceteris paribus. 
 H1a: the greater the perceived penalties, the lower the likelihood of salary 
under-reporting. 
 H1b: the greater the perceived risks of detection, the lower the likelihood 
of salary under-reporting. 
 
1.3. Tax morale approach 
 
In the past few years, an alternative policy approach has emerged which 
asserts that employers and employees do not always weigh up the cost/benefit 
ratio since many voluntarily comply even when the benefit/cost ratio suggests that 
they should not (Alm et al., 2010; Kirchler, 2007; Murphy, 2008; Murphy and 
+DUULV$µWD[PRUDOH¶DSSURDFKKDVWKXVHPHUJHGYLHZLQJSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQ
non-compliance to result from low tax morale, by which is meant a low intrinsic 
motivation to pay taxes (Alm and Torgler, 2006, 2011; Cummings et al., 2009; 
McKerchar, Bloomquist and Pope, 2013; Torgler, 2011; Torgler and Schneider, 
2007). The goal is therefore to improve tax morale so that they self-regulate 
(Kirchler, 2007; Torgler, 2007, 2011).    
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Its roots lie in the work of Georg von Schanz (1890) who well over a 
century ago highlighted the relevance of a tax contract between the state and its 
FLWL]HQV6RPHVL[GHFDGHVODWHUWKH*HUPDQµ&RORJQHVFKRRORIWD[SV\FKRORJ\¶
measured tax morale (see Schmölders, 1952, 1960, 1962; Strümpel, 1969) and 
saw it as strongly related to tax non-compliance (Schmölders, 1960). Although 
the rise of the deterrence approach from the 1970s resulted in the demise of such 
a tax morale approach, since the turn of the millennium, it has begun to come to 
the fore again (Alm et al., 2012; Kirchler, 2007; Torgler, 2007, 2011). The goal is 
to raise tax morale so as to elicit greater voluntary commitment to compliant 
behaviour (Alm and Torgler, 2011; Torgler, 2012; Williams, 2014).  
This tax morale approach can be conceptualised from the perspective of 
institutional theory (Baumol and Blinder, 2008; North, 1990). Here, societies are 
composed of firstly, formal institutions, defined as the codified laws and 
regulations which are the legal rules of the game, and secondly, informal 
institutions, defined as WKH µVRFLDOO\ VKDUHG UXOHV XVXDOO\ XQZULWWHQ WKDW DUH
created, communicated and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels 
(Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, p. 727). Tax morale measures the degree to which 
WKH IRUPDO LQVWLWXWLRQV µVWDWH PRUDOH¶ DUH QRW DOLJQHG ZLWK WKH LQIRUPDO
LQVWLWXWLRQV µFLYLFPRUDOH¶When there is asymmetry, tax morale is low and 
participation in under-declared employment more extensive. To evaluate the 
validity of adopting this policy approach towards tackling salary under-reporting, 
therefore, the following hypothesis can be evaluated: 
 
Tax morale hypothesis (H2): the greater the tax morale, the lower the likelihood 
of salary under-reporting. 
  
2. Data and variables 
 
2.1. Data 
 
To evaluate these hypotheses, data is reported from 6,019 face-to-face 
interviews conducted in Bulgaria, Croatia and FYR Macedonia between July and 
October 2015 (approximately 2,000 per country). This survey was conducted for 
the pXUSRVH RI WKH (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ¶V )UDPHZRUN  ,QGXVWU\-Academia 
3DUWQHUVKLSV3URJUDPPH ,$33 UHVHDUFKSURMHFW HQWLWOHG µ2XWRI WKH VKDGRZV
developing capacities and capabilities for tackling undeclared work in Bulgaria, 
&URDWLDDQG)<50DFHGRQLD¶*5(<). A purpose was to examine not only which 
employees receive envelope wages but also the perceived penalties and risk of 
detection, and level of tax morale.  
To collect this data, a nationally representative sample of the population 
was surveyed in each country. To achieve this, a multi-stage random (probability) 
sampling methodology was used to ensure that on the specific issues of gender, 
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age, region and locality size, the national level sample in each country, as well as 
each level of the sample, was representative in proportion to each of these 
variables. As such, the survey is representative of the national population with 
regard to not only gender and age, but also to the regional distribution of the 
population and the proportions of the population living in rural areas and villages, 
towns and larger cities (see Appendix 1). ,QHYHU\KRXVHKROGWKHµFORVHVWELUWKGD\¶
rule was applied to selected respondents, while every subsequent address where 
DQ LQWHUYLHZ ZDV FRQGXFWHG ZDV GHWHUPLQHG E\ WKH VWDQGDUG µUDQGRP URXWH¶
procedure used in Eurobarometer surveys.   
 
2.2. Variables 
 
To evaluate who receives envelope wages, and whether increasing the 
penalties and risks of detection, and greater tax morale, reduces the likelihood of 
salary under-reporting in southeast Europe, the dependent variable is whether 
employees received envelope wages based on the following question: ³6RPHWLPHV
employers prefer to pay all or part of the salary or the regular salary of the 
remuneration for extra work or overtime hours cash-in-hand and without 
declaring it to tax or social security authorities. Did your employer pay you all or 
SDUWRI\RXULQFRPHLQWKHODVWPRQWKVLQWKLVZD\"´  
To analyse the association between the under-reporting of salaries and the 
policy measures, three explanatory variables are used. Firstly, the association 
between participation and the perceived risk of detection is evaluated using a 
categorical variable that rates the perceived risk of being caught as either very 
small, fairly small, fairly high or very high. Secondly, the relationship between 
salary under-reporting and penalties is evaluated using a categorical variable that 
examines whether the perceived sanctions are that: normal tax or social security 
contributions are due; normal tax or social security contributions are due, plus a 
fine; or prison.  
Third and finally, the relationship between envelope wages and institutional 
asymmetry is evaluated using an interval variable where respondents rated the 
acceptability of four different types of undeclared work using a 10-point Likert 
scale (1 equals absolutely unacceptable and 10 equals absolutely acceptable). 
These were: a firm hires an individual and all or a part of the wages paid to him/her 
are not officially declared; a firm hires another firm on an undeclared basis; a firm 
is hired by a household to do work that is not declared; and somebody evades 
taxes by not declaring or only partially declaring their income.  
Table 1 reports these explanatory variables along with control variables 
which have been selected based on the results of past studies of participation in 
salary under-reporting (Williams and Horodnic, 2015a,b, 2016; Williams and 
Padmore, 2013a,b).  
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Table 1. Summary of covariates used in the logit regression 
 
Variable 
name 
Description Values Number of 
missing 
values  
Gender A dummy variable for 
UHVSRQGHQW¶V 
Gender 
0 - male; 
1 ± female 
0 
Age An interval variable 
indicating the 
exact age of a respondent 
Values representing exact age 0 
Marital 
status 
A categorical variable 
denoting the civil state of 
a respondent 
1 ± single 
2 - married 
3 - cohabiting 
4 - divorced/separated 
5 ± widowed 
29 
Area of 
economic 
activity 
A categorical variable 
describing the economic 
sector (in a wider sense) 
in which a respondent 
works 
1 - construction; 
2 - industry and transport; 
3 - household and repair 
services; 
4 - hospitality and service 
sector; 
5 - retail; 
6 - agriculture; 
7 ± other 
72 
Detection 
risk 
A categorical variable for 
perceived risk of being 
detected when engaged 
in unregistered activities 
1 - very small; 
2 - fairy small; 
3 - fairy high; 
4 - very high 
189 
Expected 
sanctions 
A categorical variable 
measuring anticipated 
penalties when caught in 
carrying out unregistered 
activities 
1 - normal tax or social 
security contributions 
due; 
2 - normal tax or social 
security contributions 
due, plus a fine; 
3 ± prison 
446 
Tax morale An interval variable 
measuring respondents 
tax morale 
µ¶GHQRWHVWKHKLJKHVWOHYHORI
tax 
PRUDOH DQG µ¶ WKH ORZHVW
level 
90 
Country A categorical variable 
denoting a country of 
residence  
1 - Croatia 
2 - Bulgaria 
3 - FYR Macedonia 
0 
Source: own representation based on the GREY Survey 
 
Tackling the illegitimate under-reporting of salaries in Southeast Europe  |  13 
 
 
Eastern Journal of European Studies | Volume 8(1) 2017 | ISSN: 2068-6633 | CC BY | www.ejes.uaic.ro 
 
In this survey, there was a large number of missing answers and values (i.e. 
UHIXVDO DQG µGRQ¶W NQRZ¶ DFURVV QRW RQO\ the dependent but also independent 
variables. Multiple imputation was therefore used to predict these values. A system 
of chained equations was employed in order that for each variable with missing 
values, thirty imputations were simulated for each of the missing values. Moreover, 
population weighting was applied based on the age and gender characteristics in 
order to correct any over- or under-representation in the sample. 
 
3. Findings 
 
Of the 6,019 respondents interviewed in 2015 in Bulgaria, Croatia and FYR 
Macedonia, 2,545 were employees in employment, of which 291 (11.4 per cent) 
reported receiving envelope wages. Figure 1 compares the findings regarding the 
prevalence of salary under-reporting with the responses in the earlier 2007 and 2013 
Eurobarometer surveys. Starting with Croatia, which was not included in the 2007 
survey, the finding is that between 2013 and 2015, there was a slight decrease from 
8.2 per cent in 2013 to 6.6 per cent in 2015 of employees receiving envelope wages. 
In Bulgaria, in contrast, the share was 14 per cent in 2007, 6.5 per cent in 2013 and 
14.5 per cent in 2015. Whether such disparities reflect the changes in economic 
environment in Bulgaria or not, they are certainly not due to differences in 
methodological approach, given that an identical question and sampling procedure 
was applied in all three surveys. Finally, and in FYR Macedonia, not covered by the 
Eurobarometer survey, this 2015 survey is the first attempt to enumerate the level 
of salary under-reporting using a common methodology to that applied in other 
countries. The finding is that 13% of employees in this EU-candidate country were 
receiving envelope wages.  
Table 2 reports the share of net income received as an undeclared 
(envelope) wage. This reveals that three out of ten employees receiving under-
reported salaries did not receive more than 20 per cent of their income as an 
envelope wage, while four out of ten were receiving between 21 per cent and 40 
per cent of their net income as an envelope wage. Some three out of ten refused 
to answer or did not know. There are again slight discrepancies between the 
countries, as it is noticeable that workers in FYR Macedonia were receiving a 
greater slice of their income as an envelope wage than their counterparts in 
Bulgaria and Croatia.  
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Figure 1. Prevalence of salary under-reporting, % of respondents 
 
Source: own representation based on the Special Eurobarometer 284/Wave 67.3, the 
Special Eurobarometer 402/Wave 79.2 and the GREY Survey 
 
Table 2. Share of net income received as an envelope wage, % of employees 
receiving under-reported salaries 
 
 Overall Croatia Bulgaria FYR Macedonia 
1-20% 30.4 31.4 30.3 30.0 
21-40% 26.3 29.2 34.0 12.2 
41-60% 8.7 10.5 6.7 11.1 
61-80% 1.5 0.0 1.3 2.6 
81-100% 4.4 1.7 2.1 9.6 
DK/Refusal 28.7 27.2 25.6 34.5 
Source: aXWKRUV¶RZQZRUNEDVHGRQWKH*5(<6XUYH\ 
 
As the literature review highlighted, no surveys have so far evaluated the 
conditions employers impose when such a verbal agreement is reached to pay an 
additional undeclared (envelope wage). For the first time, therefore, this survey 
asked respondents whether additional conditions were attached and if so, whether 
they agreed to a range of specific conditions in return for receiving an envelope 
wage, namely: no additional conditions were agreed; to work longer working 
hours than is stipulated in the formal contract; not to take the full statutory holiday 
allowance; to do different tasks from what is stated in the formal contract; and 
other conditions. Figure 2 reports the findings. Some 52 per cent of those receiving 
envelope wages had additional conditions attached to their receipt of this 
0
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undeclared additional wage; 30 per cent were asked to work longer hours, 19 per 
cent to conduct tasks not stated in their contract, and 13 per cent not to take their 
full statutory holiday entitlements. There are, nevertheless, variations across the 
countries. Recipients of envelope wages were not only more likely to have 
additional conditions attached in Croatia (60.1 per cent) than in FYR Macedonia 
(59.2 per cent) or Bulgaria (44.5 per cent), but the specific conditions attached 
varied cross-nationally. Although longer hours was the most frequently cited 
additional condition in all three countries, the next most commonly cited in 
Croatia and Bulgaria was to undertake different tasks from those in the formal 
contract, but it was to forego holiday entitlements in FYR Macedonia.   
 
Figure 2. Additional conditions attached to envelope wage payments, % of 
employees with under-reported salaries 
 
 
Source: own representation  
0
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Overall Croatia Bulgaria FYR Macedonia
No additional conditions
Longer working hours than stated in the contract
Not full statutory holiday allowance is taken
Conducting different tasks than stated in the contract
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Table 3 reports the descriptive results on the distribution of salary under-reporting 
among various employee groups and also their views on penalties, risks of 
detection and the acceptability of the undeclared economy (i.e. their tax morale). 
Examining which categories of employees are more likely to receive envelope 
wages, there are substantial similarities between the three countries. In all three 
economies, men are far more likely to receive envelope wages than women (13.4 
per cent compared with 9.5 per cent), although the gender difference is less 
pronounced in Croatia than in Bulgaria and FYR Macedonia. Similarity is also 
noticeable when it comes to age; the proportion of employees receiving an 
envelope wage declines with age. This is particularly pronounced in Croatia and 
FYR Macedonia. Marital status, however, has little impact on the propensity to 
receive envelope wages. Married individuals are slightly less prone to receive 
envelope wages, while no perceptible difference between the remaining groups is 
noticeable.  
The distribution of envelope wage earners by sector, however, does show 
differences between countries. While in Croatia, envelope wages were most 
frequent among agricultural employees, in Bulgaria it is among those employed in 
household and repair services and in FYR Macedonia the construction sector. 
However, these differences should not be exaggerated. The construction sector is 
among the top two sectors for envelope wages in all three countries, while the same 
holds true for agriculture in Croatia and FYR Macedonia (but not Bulgaria). 
Turning to the explanatory variables, no noticeable association seems to 
exist between detection risk and salary under-reporting, and this holds true for all 
three observed countries. In fact, in Bulgaria those who perceive this risk as very 
high more frequently receive envelope wages. A similar pattern is visible 
regarding the expected sanctions as, observing all three countries together, one 
can see that expected sanctions most likely have no effect on receiving envelope 
wages. Indeed, in FYR Macedonia for instance, those expecting imprisonment 
seem to be more likely to receive envelope wages than those who believe only 
financial consequences will occur.  
However, there does appear to be an association between tax morale and 
the propensity to receive envelope wages in the three countries. While only 8.5 
per cent of survey respondents expressing the highest tax morale stated they were 
receiving envelope wages from their formal employer, this share gradually 
increases up to 42 per cent for individuals who expressed absolute tolerance 
towards tax evasion. Even though the same pattern is noticeable for all three 
countries, the role of tax morale seems to be most pronounced in Bulgaria. The 
share of envelope wage earners in this country ranges from 10.9 per cent (for 
respondents strongly opposing noncompliant behaviour) to 61.7 per cent (for 
those with highly permissive attitude towards tax evasion). 
To evaluate whether there is a significant association between salary under-
reporting and these explanatory variables when the control variables are 
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introduced and held constant, as well as whether any of these control variables are 
significantly associated with salary under-reporting, Table 4 reports the results of 
a logit regression analysis. Given that only three countries are analysed, a multi-
level approach is not feasible. Here, therefore, single-level logit modelling is used, 
with the potential differences between the countries controlled for using a country 
indicator.  
Examining the control variables, and thus perhaps who should be targeted 
by inspectors seeking to tackle salary under-reporting, the first important point is 
that gender is not significantly associated with salary under-reporting. Although 
such an outcome might seem surprising at first glance, there is a plausible 
explanation. A sequential model building strategy was applied (i.e. variables were 
added one at a time), meaning that we were able to monitor how the effect of each 
individual predictor changed after adding subsequent covariates. Essentially, 
gender was significant until sector was included in the model. Once the latter was 
controlled for, the significance of gender disappeared. This is largely because the 
majority of construction workers in the survey were men, while women dominate 
in other sectors, such as retail and the service sector. Indeed, although there was a 
moderate correlation between gender and sector, it was within required limits and 
therefore both predictors were retained in the model. As the results display, firms 
from sectors in which women are the majority workforce are less likely to under-
report salaries. More precisely, the findings are that workers in retail, industry and 
transport, as well as in the hospitality and service sector, are less likely to under-
report salaries than their counterparts in construction. On the other hand, no 
statistically significant differences in propensity to receive envelope wages was 
found between individuals working in agriculture and construction workers, and 
the same applies for workers conducting household and repair services. Beyond 
this, it is also revealed that younger individuals are more likely to engage in this 
practice, while marital status seems not to be an important factor. Finally, the 
variable controlling for the country of residence confirms the descriptive findings 
that employees in Croatia are less likely to engage in salary under-reporting than 
their counterparts in Bulgaria and FYR Macedonia. 
Importantly for the policy approaches for tackling salary under-reporting, 
tax morale is a significant predictor for the propensity to receive envelope wages 
(confirming H2), while there is no statistically significant relationship between 
envelope wages and either the risk of detection (refuting H1b) or the level of 
penalties (refuting H1a).  
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Table 4. Logit regression of the likelihood of salary under-reporting 
 
 
kE  Standard error 
Female -0.209 0.146 
Age  -0.027*** 0.007 
Marital status (RC: Single)   
Married -0.459* 0.196 
Cohabiting 0.184 0.260 
Divorced/Separated 0.594 0.338 
Widowed 0.840 0.477 
Area of economic activity (RC: Construction)  
Industry and transport -0.727** 0.256 
Household and repair 
services 
-0.635 0.337 
Hospitality and service 
sector 
-0.926** 0.282 
 Retail -1.122*** 0.290 
Agriculture -0.598 0.487 
Other -1.268*** 0.270 
Detection risk (RC: Very small)  
Fairly small -0.112 0.190 
Fairly high -0.034 0.203 
Very high 0.202 0.243 
Expected sanctions (RC: Tax + social security contributions due) 
Tax + contribution + fine -0.070 0.154 
Prison -0.146 0.353 
Tax morale  0.263*** 0.035 
Country (RC: Croatia)   
Bulgaria 1.000*** 0.193 
FYR Macedonia 0.899*** 0.215 
Cons -1.164** 0.427 
Number of observations 2539  
Number of imputations 30  
Prob > F 0.000  
Pseudo R2 0.119  
Area under ROC 0.739  
Notes: (1) Significance: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, (standard errors in parentheses). 
(2) Estimates based on multiple imputation technique with 30 imputations. (3) Since tax 
morale is given on an inverse scale, positive coefficients indicate that lower tax morale 
entails higher likelihood to participate in quasi-formal employment 
Source: aXWKRUV¶RZQZRUNEDVHGRQWKH*5(<6XUYH\ 
 
To further explore the effects of these explanatory variables on the 
prevalence of salary under-reporting, Figure 3 outlines the predicted probabilities 
IRUDµUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶HPSOR\HHHQJDJLQJLQVDODU\XQGHU-reporting, according to 
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WKHLUDJHDQGOHYHORIWD[PRUDOH7KLVµUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶ZRrker is defined using 
mean and modal values of the remaining six predictors. That is to say, the 
representative citizen is a married Croatian male working in the industry sector, 
who thinks that the risk of being detected by the authorities is fairly small and 
expects to pay taxes and social security contributions due plus a fine if prosecuted. 
For simplicity, only the figures for representative workers aged 24, 25, 50 and 62 
are shown. This reveals that the probability of receiving envelope wages ranges 
from slightly above zero to almost 40 per cent, depending on the age and level of 
tax morale of the representative employee. For instance, while only two out of 100 
workers who are 62 years old and with the highest tax morale (and with all other 
characteristics as defined above) are expected to receive envelope wages, it 
increases to 18 out of 100 for those who find tax evasion absolutely acceptable. 
For employees aged 24, one in 20 expressing zero-tolerance towards tax evasion 
are expected to receive envelope wages, but this rises to some 38 out of 100 for 
those with completely permissive attitude towards disobedience with tax 
legislation.  
 
Figure 3. Predicted probability of receiving envelope wages of a 
µUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶ZRUNHUE\WD[PRUDOHDQGDJH 
 
 
Note: Tax morale is measured on the scale from 1 to 10, with value 1 indicating completely 
unacceptable and 10 absolutely acceptable. Therefore, higher levels mean lower tax 
morale. 
Source: own representation based on the GREY Survey 
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A further interesting aspect to notice is the difference between age groups 
at different levels of tax morale. While this dissimilarity in probabilities to receive 
envelope wages is almost negligible for individuals with the highest tax morale, 
age appears to play an increasingly important role as tax morale declines. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
This analysis of a 2015 survey conducted in Bulgaria, Croatia and FYR 
Macedonia for the first time reveals the conditions that are attached by employers 
to the receipt of envelope wages. It reveals that 52 per cent of those receiving 
envelope wages had additional conditions attached to their receipt of this 
undeclared additional wage; 30 per cent were asked to work longer hours, 19 per 
cent to conduct tasks not stated in their contract, and 13 per cent not to take their 
full statutory holiday entitlements.  
It also reveals that despite most governments pursuing the deterrence 
approach when seeking to tackle salary under-reporting, there is no significant 
correlation between participation in salary under-reporting and either the risk of 
detection or level of penalties. There is, however, a strong significant correlation 
between tax morale and participation in salary under-reporting. In other words, 
when the norms, values and beliefs of workers do not adhere to those of the state 
in terms of the codified laws and regulations, there is a greater likelihood of them 
receiving envelope wages.   
If salary under-reporting is to be tackled, therefore, it is primarily tax 
morale that needs to be addressed. Increasing the perceived level of penalties and 
risk of detection confronting employees has no impact on the probability of salary 
under-reporting. The currently widely used deterrence approach therefore needs 
to be at a very minimum complemented by a tax morale approach. What policy 
measures are therefore required to improve tax morale? To answer this, low tax 
morale has been here conceptualised through the lens of institutional theory as a 
measure of the lack of alignment of the laws, codes and regulations of formal 
institutions and the norms, beliefs and values of informal institutions (Helmke and 
Levitsky, 2004; Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland and Sirmon, 2009). As such, two sets of 
policy initiatives can reduce the asymmetry EHWZHHQ IRUPDO LQVWLWXWLRQV µVWDWe 
PRUDOH¶DQGLQIRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQVµFLYLFPRUDOH¶DQGWKXVLPSURYHWD[PRUDOH
and in doing so, reduce salary under-reporting.  
Firstly, policy initiatives are required to change the norms, values and 
beliefs regarding the acceptability of the undeclared economy. This requires 
marketing campaigns to raise awareness among employees about the benefits of 
not under-reporting salaries and the costs of doing so in terms of the future benefits 
foregone. It also requires initiatives to educate citizens about the wider benefits of 
taxation in terms of the public goods and services that they receive in return for 
the taxes they pay. Such policy initiatives might range from introducing the issue 
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of taxation in the civics curriculum in schools, through letters to taxpayers about 
KRZWKHLUWD[HVDUHEHLQJVSHQWWRVLJQVVWDWLQJµ\RXUWD[HVSDLGIRUWKLV¶RQURDGV
ambulances and fire engines, and in hospitals, doctors surgeries and schools.  
Secondly, however, formal institutions also need to be reformed, especially 
in countries where formal institutional inefficiencies and deficiencies result in a 
lack of trust in government. On the one hand, therefore, policy initiatives are 
needed to change the macro-level conditions that lead to lower tax morale, which 
includes increasing the level of expenditure on active labour market policies to 
support vulnerable groups and the level of expenditure on social protection (Autio 
and Fu, 2015; Horodnic, 2016; Thai and Turkina, 2014). On the other hand, it also 
involves modernising formal institutions. As shown in previous studies, voluntary 
compliance and tax morale improves when citizens: view the state authorities as 
treating them in a respectful, impartial and responsible manner (Gangl, 
Muehlbacher, de Groot, Goslinga, Hofmann, Kogler, Antonides and Kirchler, 
2013; Murphy, 2005); believe that they pay their fair share compared with others 
(Kirchgässner, 2010, 2011; Molero and Pujol, 2012), and they believe that they 
receive the goods and services they deserve for the taxes they pay (McGee, 2005). 
These findings, nevertheless, are based on just one dataset and are thus tentative. 
7KHOLPLWDWLRQRIWKLVUHVHDUFKLVWKDWLWRQO\H[DPLQHVHPSOR\HHV¶DWWLWXGHV
towards salary under-reporting and does not evaluate in the eyes of employers the 
effectiveness of the deterrence and tax morale approaches. It is also limited to just 
three countries. If this paper thus stimulates further evaluations of the 
effectiveness of these policy approaches among employers and in other Eastern 
European countries, it will have fulfilled one of its intentions. If this then 
stimulates governments to consider alternative approaches other than simply the 
deterrence approach, it will have fulfilled its wider intention.    
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. An overview of the sampled individuals by demographic and 
geographical characteristics, % of respondents  
 
  Overall Croatia Bulgaria FYR  Macedonia 
G
en
de
r Male 45.5 41.3 47.2 47.9 
Female 54.5 58.7 52.8 52.1 
A
ge
 
15-24 11.7 12.1 9.2 13.7 
25-34 16.5 15.8 16.9 16.9 
35-44 16.7 13.9 21.8 14.4 
45-54 18.7 18.6 19.8 17.6 
55-64 18.1 20.1 16.4 17.8 
65+ 18.3 19.5 15.9 19.6 
Ty
pe
 
o
f 
co
m
m
u
n
.
 
Rural area or village 36.7 38.7 28.6 42.7 
Small or middle sized town 31.3 35.2 22.1 36.7 
Large town 32.0 26.1 49.3 20.6 
R
eg
io
n
 
(C
roa
tia
) Zagreb and surroundings - 25.8 - - 
North Croatia - 17.4 - - 
Slavonia - 16.6 - - 
Lika and Banovina - 8.2 - - 
Istria, Primorje and Gorski Kotar - 12.1 - - 
Dalmatia - 19.9 - - 
R
eg
io
n
 
(B
ulg
ar
ia
) North-West - - 11.0 - 
North-Central - - 11.7 - 
North-East - - 13.9 - 
South-East - - 14.2 - 
South-West - - 27.9 - 
South-Central - - 21.3 - 
R
eg
io
n
 
(F
Y
R
 M
ac
ed
o
n
ia
) Vardar - - - 7.3 
East - - - 8.8 
South-West - - - 10.9 
South-East - - - 8.4 
Pelagonia - - - 10.9 
Polog - - - 15.7 
North-East - - - 8.4 
Skopje - - - 29.6 
Source: aXWKRUV¶RZQZRUNEDVHGRQWKH*5(<6XUYH\ 
 
